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Chapter 3
What Is Economics for?
Brendan Hogan
Abstract The methodological foundations of any scientific discipline are shaped by 
the goals towards which that discipline is aiming. While it is almost universally 
accepted that the goals of explanation and prediction of natural and non-human phe-
nomena have been met with great success since the scientific revolution, it is almost 
just as universally accepted that the social sciences have not even come close to 
achieving these goals. This raises the question addressed in this paper, namely, what 
is economics, and social science more broadly speaking, for? What is their aim, and 
how is it similar and dissimilar to that of the natural sciences as we have come to 
classify them? I take up this question from a pragmatic perspective in this paper, set-
ting economics within the wider context of social inquiry. Specifically, I turn to 
Hilary Putnam and John Dewey as exemplars of the pragmatic critique of any eco-
nomics that sees its goals in line with those of the natural sciences, that is, as aiming 
for explanation and prediction according to governing laws of human behaviour.
The methodological principles that have come to be enumerated as the fundamental 
starting points of neoclassical economics have been subjected to critique since their 
beginnings in the Marginal Revolution. The rational agent, the utility maximizing 
character of their choices, and the methodological individualism that dovetailed so 
nicely with advancing methods of quantification have all been called into question 
if not completely refuted from a variety of quarters.1 These critics come from such 
areas of intellectual specialization as the philosophy of the social sciences (espe-
cially its subbranch the philosophy of economics), disciplines in the humanities 
outside of the sciences, and even within economics itself. The latter group of critics 
suffered increasing marginalization as the ascendancy of neoclassical economics 
married a positivist philosophical underpinning to the scientific pretensions and 
mathematizing tendencies of economics as a discipline. It is not without some 
1 See, e.g., Anderson (2000).
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unintended irony, then, that the practitioners of this science borrowed a distinction 
from theological discourse and termed mainstream methods ‘orthodox’ and those 
outside of the dominant discourse, ‘heterodox’.
However, as a now well-told story in philosophical accounts of economics has it, 
while positivism and specifically the philosophy of science embodied in logical 
empiricism fell upon hard times in the mid-twentieth century and was bypassed, the 
mainstream practitioners of economics of at least two schools seemed to ignore 
entirely the failure of positivism to account for a variety of its own aims. These 
failures reproduced themselves in neoclassical economics in terms of explanation, 
the irrational choices agents make, and a consistent failure to generate models which 
would predict aggregate market behaviour.2 Behavioural economists took these fail-
ures as their starting point in reintroducing irrationality into their understanding of 
human decisions and now stands as a major contender for explanatory adequacy in 
providing economics with better scientific grounds for its intellectual project. It also 
has gained greater political traction in terms of policy. But the question of the rela-
tion between values intrinsic to the practice of science and the descriptions gener-
ated by that scientific activity itself still remains outside the organon of these two 
major schools of economic thought. This exclusion shows up in two ways. First, 
both schools basically accept that the end of human activity is the realization of 
individual preferences. On the neoclassical model, this involves the cost-benefit 
analysis of an internal algorithm that calculates action based upon given preferences 
and available information regarding means to satisfy those preferences. Behavioural 
economics introduces paternalistic interventions at the level of policy prescriptions 
to overcome the irrationality of individuals in the erroneous choices they make to 
satisfy their given preferences. Agents exhibit irrationality stemming from a variety 
of sources including cognitive biases and framing effects that lead to choices which 
do not maximize utility. Thus, both see action and economically informed policy as 
a means for preference satisfaction. That is, whether you model practical reason as 
neoclassical economists do, on what might be characterized as a Humean desire- 
belief model, or you follow behavioural economists in eliciting the inherent cogni-
tive biases which interfere with our preference satisfaction, you isolate the question 
of morality from the discipline of economic inquiry. This first shows up in both 
schools’ attempt to provide a value-free and predictive account of economic science.
In this chapter I offer an alternative path for characterizing the practice of eco-
nomics that is informed by a pragmatic account of social science. On this under-
standing, as pragmatic philosophers from Charles Sanders Peirce to Hilary Putnam 
have argued, facts and values are inextricably intertwined in the practice of all 
2 The 2008 financial crisis is an example of this failure, a failure so striking as to sponsor a royal 
commission of leading economists to explain why economists had failed to predict it in the UK. In 
the US, the testimony of Alan Greenspan before a committee in the House of Representatives has 
become a touchstone for calls for reform in economics. See in particular his exchange with Rep. 
Henry Waxman. https://www.c-span.org/video/?c3342718/waxman-greenspan-testimony
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science.3 Additionally, according to the pragmatic view on offer here, sciences on a 
pragmatic understanding take their cue from the Aristotelian dictum that we should 
order our method and the goal of our inquiries to the object we are trying to under-
stand. However, somewhat counter-intuitively pragmatism offers a general theory 
of inquiry as problem solving. It follows from this hybrid of object-specific methods 
and a fundamental problem-solving aim that if what we are trying to solve are not 
just problems of physics, for instance, but also the frustration of values and interests 
of human beings, the inquiry itself will take on a moral character both in terms of 
vocabulary used to engage the problem, and in terms of the character of the inquiry 
itself. Thus, from the pragmatic view on offer in this paper, economics cannot help 
but be a moral science as it involves issues of labour, distribution, inequality and 
scarce resources that affect the flourishing of the human species, and now much 
more broadly, the flourishing of species on the planet. Once economics is redrawn 
in this way, and the pretensions of economics to be a ‘science’ modelled on the 
natural scientific goals of explanation and prediction are reconstructed, the question 
‘What is economics for? ‘might be given a morally and epistemologically 
robust answer.
In turning to pragmatism, I would like to focus on several features that bring into 
relief the general orientation pragmatism provides at the epistemological and scien-
tific level. In particular, and what stands in stark contrast to what might be seen as 
the two main contenders for supremacy in economics mentioned above, pragmatism 
embeds values in the process of inquiry itself to the point of denying a rigid fact/
value dichotomy even with respect to such paradigms of value-neutrality as physics 
and the rest of the natural sciences. Hilary Putnam was perhaps the most vocal prag-
matist in destroying the idea that facts and values are judgments, when expressed as 
propositions, that can be completely disentangled from each other. It is not only 
present in his perhaps most famous work, Reason, Truth, and History, but it is the 
topic of an entirely separate book, more than two decades later, The Collapse of the 
Fact/Value dichotomy.4 These works serve as the foundation for his later work in the 
philosophy of economics. In The End of Value Free Economics with Vivian Walsh. 
Putnam writes:
There are facts (using the term as we ordinarily do—not as a term in metaphysical theory, 
which… is what the logical positivists did) which come into view only through the lenses 
of an evaluative outlook. ‘Virtue terms—terms such as ‘brave’, ‘wise’, compassionate’, 
‘resourceful’, and their opposites, have indeed figured in philosophical discussions for mil-
lennia precisely for this reason.5
3 Putnam has most recently clarified his position on facts and values with respect to ontology, logic, 
and mathematics as a special case of employing, borrowing a term from Jennifer Case, “optional 
languages”. That these alternative conceptual approaches, what he dubs his ‘conceptual pluralism’, 
is a result of not having one true mode of describing the world, and that the choice is based on 
interests which have an evaluative and rational basis. This pluralism, however, does not have the 
consequence of relativism or anti-realism. For his late articulation of this thesis, see Putnam (2016).
4 See Putnam (1980) and Putnam (2004)
5 Putnam (2003, 396). Repr. in Putnam and Walsh (2012,112)
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The consequence for this view is that the attempt in economics to achieve a 
value-free model of the scientific explanation of human behaviour is fundamentally 
flawed. Thus, even if economics could imitate the natural sciences as they would 
like to do, the language involved in describing what is observed, judgments of rel-
evance, to take two elements of scientific inquiry, are value laden. The issue is dou-
bly fraught for the sciences of human behaviour as inquirers employ assumptions 
with respect to values besides using language that necessarily entangles descriptive 
and normative elements. Again Putnam:
The world we inhabit when we describe the world for purposes other than the purposes of 
physics or molecular biology or some other exact science—certainly the world we inhabit 
when we describe the world for the purposes the economist is interested in—is not describ-
able in ‘value-neutral’ terms. Not without throwing away the most significant facts along 
with the ‘value judgments’ (Putnam and Walsh 2012, 112).
Besides the issues with thick terms or descriptions that don’t allow for disentan-
gling the normative from the factual elements of propositions, another common 
feature of a variety of pragmatic thinkers with respect to social inquiry is the inter-
ests and values made explicit by the fact that something is a problem in the first 
place. That is to say, it is not just an ‘injection’ of values via the conceptual and 
linguistic arguments regarding thick concepts, the entangled character of fact and 
value in certain terms, but it is also central that problematic situations themselves 
become available for social scientific inquiry by being constituted in their fabric as 
situations by values.6 The account that pragmatism, beginning with Peirce, has of 
inquiry is as a practical activity of moving from the state of doubt to the state of 
belief. Dewey transformed the doubt-belief matrix while maintaining its general 
character, into a novel understanding of logic as a theory of inquiry.7 This extension 
6 The classic statement of this position in the pragmatist literature occurs in John Dewey’s 
Experience and Nature. There he writes:
Or is there an ingredient of truth in ancient metaphysics which may be extracted and re-
affirmed? Empirically, the existence of objects of direct grasp, possession, use and enjoy-
ment cannot be denied. Empirically, things are poignant, tragic, beautiful, humorous, 
settled, disturbed, comfortable, annoying, barren, harsh, consoling, splendid, fearful; are 
such immediately and in their own right and behalf. If we take advantage of the word 
esthetic in a wider sense than that of application to the beautiful and ugly, esthetic quality, 
immediate, final or self-enclosed, indubitably characterizes natural situations as they 
empirically occur. These traits stand in themselves on precisely the same level as colors, 
sounds, qualities of contact, taste and smell. Any criterion that finds the latter to be ultimate 
and “hard” data will, impartially applied, come to the same conclusion about the former. 
Any quality as such is final; it is at once initial and terminal; just what it is as it exists.
It is beyond the scope of this article to engage the pragmatic resources for this position. It is 
instructive that after decades of exploring such issues as the role of sense-data in our scientific and 
metaphysical theories, Putnam increasingly moves towards this position in his writing. See espe-
cially his debates with Bernard Williams as evidence of this move. In this shift he relies on Dewey, 
yes, but in his latest work turns to theories and empirical research in perception to extend his 
stance. See Dewey (1925, 82) and Putnam (2016).
7 For the classic statement of this matrix, see “The Fixation of Belief” in Peirce and Buchler (1955).
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of Peirce’s original formulation is key for both understanding the practical character 
of scientific activity, but also, crucially, the results of that activity: inquiry is contex-
tually situated and draws on the conceptual resources available for addressing fail-
ures of habits at the individual, institutional, and social level. A key element of the 
contextual character of problematic situations is what Dewey called their qualitative 
uniqueness. While they share many elements and continuities with respect to previ-
ous problem contexts, they are novel. As novel, our patterns of inference, whether 
deductive or inductive, are not enough to respond in a way that can identify, let 
alone solve, the problem at hand. Rather, it requires hypothetical inference, or 
abduction, and experiment.
In addition, on the pragmatic understanding of social science, the practical char-
acter of this activity extends beyond the supposed value-neutrality of methodologi-
cal frameworks to the end towards which economists are aiming. Practices are 
famously rule-governed activities that have embedded within them goals towards 
which they are ordered. But what is the goal of economics? Indeed, what is econom-
ics for? The model of economics that pragmatism offers takes this question to be 
one of the primary orienting features of this or any practice that would qualify as 
scientific inquiry. Briefly, before addressing this goal, it is helpful to highlight two 
aspects of pragmatism that have deep consequences for how we deal with social 
problems more broadly: the general character of the pattern of inquiry and the 
experimental nature of inquiry.
In the pragmatic understanding of inquiry, or science, or how we achieve knowl-
edge about the world (epistemology), pragmatism shares at least one methodologi-
cal similarity with positivism in at least some of its guises: scientific inquiry has one 
general pattern. Positivists, in one of its most famous versions, exiled from all 
meaningful language value propositions as senseless as they had no verification 
procedure by which they might be tested and secured in the physical sciences.8 This 
of course is the opposite of the pragmatic position as values and interests saturate 
the choices made within problem-solving contexts of all inquiry. The criteria of 
coherence, for instance, involves evaluation of fit introducing normative judgments 
into scientific procedures. While pragmatism does share with positivism the theory 
of a general pattern of inquiry, the practice of doing science and its language is 
value-laden according to pragmatism. This clashes with positivism, and following 
upon it, mainstream economics’ self-understanding. When it turns to social sciences 
(especially in the pragmatism of Dewey and Putnam, to point to the main examples 
in the background of this paper but by no means limited to just these two) this pat-
tern adapts and orders itself to the objects or subjects constituting the problematic 
context and in addition becomes historically self-conscious with respect to prior 
methods of inquiry in a cumulative way. Dewey in particular is not sanguine about 
the difficulties of fulfilling the norms of scientific inquiry with respect to social sci-
ence, but nonetheless uses it as a normative criterion for parsing what counts as 
actual social inquiry and what is merely intellectual abstractions based upon a pri-
ori theoretical commitments.
8 The two main targets in pragmatist literature taking up this argument are emotivism in ethics and 
physicalist eliminativism in metaphysics and ontology.
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This methodological self-reflection is itself shaped by the social and historical con-
texts in which it emerges. Put more directly, the very concepts and ideas which guide 
scientific inquiry are generated and activated within a context as is what ends up being 
articulated as a ‘fact’. Beyond the character, then, of our language, concepts, and judg-
ments that betray the infusion of facts and values, the intellectual means at our dis-
posal are operant within a ‘background’ that is specific to our historical and cultural 
location. This is a familiar thesis in the philosophy of science that is captured in a 
different register as the theory-dependence of our data. Putnam’s way of putting this 
within the practical circumscription of our scientific activities is by stating that “sci-
ence institutes data”.9 That is to say, the facts that are articulated in the language of 
scientists of course rely on observation, but perception for pragmatists is an interested 
affair, mediated through the conceptual resources available for making the material of 
our percepts explicit.10
Besides these conceptual features of the pragmatic understanding of inquiry, the 
general pattern as articulated by Dewey also emphasizes the existential or objective 
impact inquiry effects. That is, the activity of inquiry reconstitutes problematic situ-
ations through the intelligent intervention of humans seeking to solve their prob-
lems. Because inquiry is generated out of the doubt of the inquirer in Peirce, or the 
shattering of our projective habits and anticipations in Dewey, its resolution consists 
in the reordering of the practical context in which the problem or doubt found its 
genesis. That is to say, and here we rely on Dewey for its most explicit statement, 
inquiry involves resolving problems that emerge from breakdowns of our practices 
in such a way as to reconstruct and restore the environment:
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one 
that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements 
of the original situation into a unified whole.11
I enlist this oft-quoted definition for two reasons. The first is that it raises a whole 
host of issues as to how to understand the purposes of the sciences themselves, and 
these issues only become more complicated when dealing with human subjects. Far 
from limiting the purpose of science as creating a verified system of propositions that 
describe the natural world in a value-neutral way, pragmatic inquiry is involved in 
actively constituting the problematic situation with respect to the conceptual resources 
at hand and then engaging in experimental activity that attempts to solve the problem. 
In fact, it is in discussing social inquiry as a special instance of inquiry that Dewey 
takes pains to reiterate the world-changing or interventionist character of natural sci-
entific inquiry.
9 Rorty et al. (2004). This conversation between James Conant, Hilary Putnam, and Richard Rorty 
provides an accessible and illuminating exploration of these issues, along with Putnam’s disagree-
ments with Rorty.
10 I state the matter this way for sake of expediency. There is a much longer pragmatic story to tell 
regarding the relation of concepts, percepts, and stimuli.
11 See Dewey (1938, 109).
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3.1  The Philosophy of Social Science and Pragmatism
Here I would like to retreat to a higher level of abstraction, but one that allows for 
an understanding of how crucial the question of this reflection is to the practice of 
economics itself from a pragmatic perspective. When we place economics as a dis-
cipline grouping it under the social sciences, we can help illuminate an answer as to 
what it is for by unearthing some of the general features of inquiry in the social 
sciences, tout court. The debate over what the social sciences, in general, are for can 
be captured very generally by referring to the three ends of explanation, understand-
ing, and emancipation.12 That is, what social scientists generally consider the goal 
of a social scientific activity have tended to sort out along three lines:
 1) The social sciences aim at results akin to the explanations based on cause -effect 
covering law models as in the natural sciences, or some lesser version of induc-
tive correlation.
 2) The social sciences are geared towards mutual understanding of the meaningful 
and expressive character of an animal that is essentially self-defining and self- 
articulating through actions not reducible to a framework available to an inde-
pendent observer.
 3) The social sciences are part of an overall praxis whose ultimate goal is emanci-
pation from the irreducible dimensions of power that have thus far stratified 
societies in ways that arbitrarily oppress, dominate, and diminish human creativ-
ity through the systematic distortion of the intentions of actors.
The naturalist, interpretive and critical schools of social science then, are part of 
the conceptual inheritance of social science when it comes to the intellectual and 
practical task of addressing economic problems. Here we turn to the pluralism of 
pragmatism, and in particular to John Dewey’s philosophy of social science, to 
address the purpose of economics, vis-a-vis the philosophy of social science.
In the face of such different, and at first face incompatible ends for economics as 
a special example of social inquiry, the pragmatic approach famously employs what 
might be termed a Hegelian strategy in a metaphysically naturalist vein. That is, 
rather than select one of the methodological platforms for the purpose of social sci-
ence, pragmatism absorbs each in a pattern of inquiry that draws out the lessons for 
practical coping with problems that each method was inspired to address. Each of 
these schools helps as a stage in articulating and addressing the problem at hand. In 
addition, because problematic situations are unique and composed of variegated 
elements in differing intensities of influence, no one methodological platform has 
priority of others in an a priori fashion. In some instances what we observe using 
utility maximization models of human choice is correct. In others, it would be mis-
leading to impose these as explanations of action.13 This makes the employment of 
12 See the classic statement of these options see Fay and Moon (1977).
13 Clifford Geertz’s (1973) “Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight” remains an instructive 
touchstone for the dangers of imposing rational choice models on social phenomena.
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method a practical affair requiring an experimental and fallibilistic attitude: Are 
there causal elements to human behaviour that need be elicited to help explain the 
problematic situation? Am I really understanding what is going on in this action 
context without engaging the participants in ways such that I empathetically recon-
struct their intentions so as to give meaningful sense to their actions? Are there 
forces at work psychologically distorting practices and intentional frameworks for 
the purposes of ideological manipulation? These are all questions that will help 
illuminate human action in general, and what has come to be defined as economic 
action over time. This translation or, if you prefer, sublation of different paradigms 
of social science and, by extension, economic schools is not limited to pragmatic 
philosophy broadly to the social questions of this sort. Rather, pragmatism’s overall 
strategy is to see each of the alternatives developed in the past with regard to ethics, 
epistemology and metaphysics as methodological frames by which to assist in 
reconstructing a problematic situation in the present into a resolved whole.14
The particularly pragmatic contribution in social science, as a potential fourth 
element to social inquiry is its experimental character. Because Dewey’s philosophy 
of social science remains the most detailed working out of the pragmatic turn in 
philosophy with respect social inquiry, I will rely on his discussion of it in his 1938 
Logic: the theory of inquiry. There Dewey marks out in definite terms what the 
consequences for the pragmatic reconstruction of the history of philosophical 
inquiry are for the social sciences in the penultimate chapter of that work. There he 
states that social inquiry is especially vulnerable to the positivist doctrine of the 
strict separation of facts and values and thus the independence of social science 
from social practice:
…the idea commonly prevails that such inquiry is genuinely scientific only as it deliber-
ately and systematically abstains from all concern with matters of social practice. The spe-
cial lesson which the logic of the methods of physical inquiry has to teach to social inquiry 
is, accordingly, that social inquiry, as inquiry, involves the necessity of operations which 
existentially modify actual conditions that, as they exist, are the occasions of genuine 
inquiry and that provide its subject-matter. For, as we have seen, this lesson is the logical 
import of the experimental method.15
That is, for pragmatic social science, social action for the sake of addressing a 
problem articulated in the different methodological processes of social inquiry is 
endogenous to social inquiry itself.
14 I have referred to these questions as informing different methodological moments of social 
inquiry in Hogan and Marcelle (2017). This pluralist strategy has some current practitioners in 
contemporary economics. Ha-Joon Chang, for instance, has famously been arguing both in publi-
cations and making popular videos that at once reorient the abstractions and expert level of eco-
nomics and also challenges the orthodoxy that, while on its back heels intellectually speaking, still 
maintains sociological and political dominance. Chang in fact lists 11 different schools of econom-
ics. Also resonant with pragmatism is Chang’s insistence that the experience of an individual is a 
sufficient starting point for making informed judgments about economic systems and their out-
comes. See Ha Joon Chang (2011) and RSA- Animate: Economics for Everyone- a cognitive 
whiteboard animation. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E9EzXHVYClI
15 Dewey (1938, 486)
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Social inquiry is about solving problems, as is all inquiry, and solving the prob-
lems of human beings requires social cooperative action. A problem is not solved by 
a journal article or a monograph, no matter how brilliant. It is here that the larger 
goals of community life are inscribed within each of the social sciences. That is, 
each social science as it has been developed is actually not even scientific, according 
to pragmatism, unless it involves cooperative, coordinated action on the part of the 
individuals who live within the problematic context to solve the problem:
That which is observed, no matter how carefully and no matter how accurate the record, is 
capable of being understood only in terms of projected consequences of activities. In fine, 
problems with which inquiry into social subject-matter is concerned must, if they satisfy the 
conditions of scientific method, (1) grow out of actual social tensions, needs, “troubles”; (2) 
have their subject-matter determined by the conditions that are material means of bringing 
about a unified situation, and (3) be related to some hypothesis, which is a plan and policy 
for existential resolution of the conflicting social situation.16
Our only path for confirming our social scientific hypotheses, however, is 
through. The epistemological requirement of getting the problem right in the first 
place includes the public or practical verification of the problem through channels 
of communication that take up into the problem formation process the perspectives 
of the subjects themselves.17
This aspect of social inquiry widens the practical requirements of the social sci-
ences into a public that becomes a constitutive feature of problem formation. In 
contradistinction to appeals to technocratic management of political policies and 
legislation, the problems of political, economic, and social life are here understood 
as products of the articulation and communication of those individuals who are 
experiencing the problem themselves. Because problematic situations do not exhibit 
their constitutive features in ways that are easily legible to an observer, the demand 
to figure out what the problem is in the first instance is paramount. But rather than 
these problems being of the nature of different chemical compounds and their reac-
tion to each other, or the motion of planetary bodies, social problems involve agents 
who disagree, come into conflict, resort to violence, and have widely varying inter-
pretations of the cause and effect processes and powers governing their life-chances. 
If social scientists are going to have a chance at getting the problem right, they 
themselves must suspend their a priori predilections to define social problems 
according to a vocabulary and methodology that worked in a prior historical 
instance. This is not to elide what I earlier referred to as the contextual and histori-
cally specific character of our conceptual employments. It is to recognize the falli-
ble and situated character of our conceptual projections in light of a novel situation. 
The qualitative uniqueness, however, that is the mark of problematic situations pre-
vents inquirers from apprehending in a cognitively thorough manner environments 
that exhibit these various unique characteristics, spontaneous energies, and novel 
constellations of forces at work. In short, how we come to a robust description of the 
16 Dewey (1938, 493)
17 On the concept of practical verification, see Bohman (2003).
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actual problem at hand is through accessing those problems such that any type of 
possible hypothetical solution addresses the problems as experienced by the sub-
jects who suffer them:
The connection of social inquiry, as to social data and as to conceptual generalizations, with 
practice is intrinsic not external. Any problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out of 
actual (or “practical”) social conditions is factitious; it is arbitrarily set by the inquirer 
instead of being objectively produced and controlled. All the techniques of observation 
employed in the advanced sciences may be conformed to, including the use of the best 
statistical methods to calculate probable errors, etc., and yet the material ascertained be 
scientifically “dead,” i.e., irrelevant to a genuine issue, so that concern with it is hardly more 
than a form of intellectual busy work. That which is observed, no matter how carefully and 
no matter how accurate the record, is capable of being understood only in terms of pro-
jected consequences of activities.18
One of the constraints, then, on this understanding of social science is that prob-
lem formation itself relies upon the articulation of the frustration of interests and 
harms experienced by individuals such that our understanding of the problem can be 
as epistemologically robust as possible. It is of course possible, that subjects them-
selves articulate their perspectives saturated in misinformation, or prejudice, or 
ignorance. However, the process of social inquiry involves the public in a self- 
reflective way precisely to discover and address these deficits, and to see how these 
errors themselves contribute to the problem at hand.
In this sense the critique of the one-dimensional character of the dominant 
schools of economics is a moral one. Economics is for solving economic problems, 
and the path to solving these problems, as pragmatism understands it, requires a 
wide array of methods and approaches to even begin to get the problems of econ-
omy right in the first place. The problems are defined in conjunction with the articu-
lation and action of the subjects in the problematic context. Though it has now 
become increasingly popular to criticize the mainstream and policy powering 
branches of economics, Dewey articulated his critique and view of social science in 
the 1930s culminating in 1938, and it is not coincidental that the context within 
which Dewey was writing was the Depression and the concomitant rise of fascism 
and solidification of Soviet communism. In developing a pragmatic understanding 
of social inquiry and economics as a special instance of social inquiry at this histori-
cal conjuncture, Dewey was trenchant in his critique of all forms of political doc-
trine founded upon an understanding of human action and human society that 
reduced the explanandum of history to the explanans of economic agency.
While this historical comment is illustrative, it serves a conceptual as well as 
exemplary purpose. For if pragmatic inquiry, as inquiry, is to get a problem right, 
the unsparing criticism of all forms of economic methodology and scientific prac-
tice that hypostatize principles of inquiry into a priori certainties that control data 
selection and formulation is called for. Thus, while Dewey clearly articulated a dev-
astating critique of Soviet economism in his Freedom and Culture (1939) and 
referred to what had become of Marx’s thought in the service of the Russian 
18 Dewey (1938,492)
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revolution as “totalitarian economics”, he was no less penetrating in his critique of 
the political and economic doctrines concomitant with liberal political economies in 
the industrial world.19
To close, I have focused on the general features of those aspects of pragmatism 
that solidify its approach to economics as a moral science. I have turned to the fact/
value distinction, the philosophy of social science, and the experimental character 
of inquiry pragmatic philosophy of social science calls for in order to demonstrate 
this link. The precise way in which this becomes a moral issue is through the neces-
sity of enlisting the values and perspectives of the subjects themselves in constitut-
ing the problems social inquiry deals with under the rubric of ‘economics’. These 
conceptual and practical elements are not the only ways in which pragmatic models 
of social inquiry are relevant to a project of reconstructing economics to make plain 
its moral purpose. Specifically, the model of the agents and the availability of pref-
erences for rational evaluation in choice situations is another rich path Putnam and 
others have taken in combining ethics and economics. This is yet another way in 
which two of the dominant schools of economics wielding power in policy and 
intellectual culture, neoclassical and behavioural economics, fall short from a moral 
perspective in the practice of economics.
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